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AN ALTERNATE THEORY OF  
BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY 
 
JESSICA L. ROBERTS1 
 
*** 
If asked what was the central issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, most 
informed Americans would likely reply that it was the conflict of 
reproductive health and religious freedom.  This Essay, however, argues 
for an alternate reading of that now infamous case.  It proposes that 
Hobby Lobby is best understood as a demonstration of how the continued 
reliance on employer-provided benefits renders employers de facto health-
care policy makers with the ability to profoundly impact the health-care 





  In 2014, the Supreme Court decided the controversial case Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby, holding that, pursuant to the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, private employers could lawfully refuse to comply with 
the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) contraceptive mandate.2 Common 
rallying cries among opponents of Hobby Lobby’s position were “No 
Bosses in My Bedroom” and “Birth Control is Not My Boss’s Business.”3  
                                                                                                                                      
1 George Butler Research Professor and Director of the Health Law and Policy 
Institute, University of Houston Law Center.  Thanks to Seth J. Chandler, Dave 
Fagundes, Allison Hoffman, Brendan Maher, Jessica Mantel, Amy Monahan, 
James Nelson, D. Theodore Rave, Chris Robertson, and Paul Secunda for 
commenting on earlier drafts.  My appreciation also goes to the participants of the 
2014 ERISA, Employee Benefits, and Social Insurance National Conference and 
the 2014 American Society for Law, Medicine, and Ethics Annual Health Law 
Professors Conference, and, of course, the organizers of the University of 
Connecticut Insurance Law Center’s and Connecticut Insurance Law Journal’s 
Spring 2015 Symposium, The Affordable Care Act Turns Five.  And many thanks 
to Cecilia Isenberg for research assistance, Emily Lawson for library help, and 
Elaine Fiala for administrative support. 
2 573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
3 Several protestors held signs with type of slogans.  See, e.g., http:// 
www.jta.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/hobby-lobby.jpg; http://thinkprogress.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/03/GW-college-dems-hobby-lobby-scotus.jpg.  For more 
about activism invoking this theme, see NARAL, Not My Bosses Business, available 
at https://secure.prochoiceamerica.org/site/Advocacy?cmd=display&page=UserAction 
&id=6005; UltraViolet, No Bosses in My Bedroom, available at 
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Although the legal issue presented in the case was whether a private 
corporation is exempt from a law that its owners oppose for religious 
reasons, many Americans’ core objection to the decision was its 
implication that private employers could dictate our access to reproductive 
health care. 
This Essay offers an alternate theory of Hobby Lobby.  I propose 
that instead of a case about religious freedom, Hobby Lobby is best 
understood as a case about the potential perils of the employer-provided 
benefits system. While other scholars have noted the effect of employment 
on health insurance and, consequently, health-care access, Hobby Lobby 
reveals that employers dictate even more about the ability to access health 
care in the United States than simply whether an individual has insurance. 
In the past, private employers have offered their employees 
relatively generous coverage of their own volition.  However, following the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) some employers will find 
themselves facing legal penalties if they do not provide comprehensive, 
affordable health insurance to their full-time employees.  As primary 
providers of health insurance, private employers regularly make any 
number of employment- and insurance-related decisions that ultimately 
shape the contours of health-care access: whom to insure, what policies to 
offer, which treatments and providers to cover, and more.  Consequently, 
employers are vested with decisions that directly impact the type and 
amount of health care that is available to millions of Americans. 
In reframing the Hobby Lobby decision, this Essay exposes an 
unfortunate reality: Private employers are acting as de facto health-care 
policy makers.  Following the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in 
Hobby Lobby, Americans have gotten a glimpse of how an individual 
employer’s decisions can affect the health-care access of its employees.  
However, this Essay reveals that these restrictions go well beyond the issue 
of contraception. As employer-provided benefits remain an enduring aspect 
of the American health-insurance system, at least in the short-term,4 it is 
essential to explore their effect on accessing needed health care. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I outlines the dominant 
narrative of Hobby Lobby as a religious freedom case and the continued 
reliance on employers to provide health insurance in the United States.  
Part II explores how employers—many of whom have even stronger 
incentives to provide health insurance to their employees post-ACA—act 
                                                                                                                                      
http://act.weareultraviolet.org/sign/scotus_birthctrl_video/# 
4 See Jessica L. Roberts, The ACA Double-Bind (in progress) (on file with 
author). 
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as both gatekeepers and regulators of health care.  Part III then reframes the 
issue as a classic agency problem and proposes that the solution might not 
be further regulation but a move away from the employer-provided system. 
 
I. DOMINANT NARRATIVE OF BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY 
 
Part I describes the Hobby Lobby case and its political and popular 
framing as a titanic conflict between socially conservative religious rights 
advocates and socially liberal champions of reproductive health.  However, 
this reading of the case fails to address the issue of why a private company 
like Hobby Lobby is offering health insurance to its employees.  To address 
this inquiry, Part I then turns to the employer-provided benefits system that 
made the controversy in Hobby Lobby possible and how ACA recently 
changed that system. 
 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT CASE 
 
 Given the wide spread media attention it received, many 
Americans may already be familiar with.  Nonetheless, I begin by briefly 
summarizing the case and the statutory provisions it interprets. 
  Among the statute’s many provisions, the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) requires group health-insurance policies—including employer-
provided plans—to offer women “preventative care and screenings” 
without “any cost sharing requirements” absent an applicable exception.5  
While Congress did not specifically define what constituted “preventative 
care and screenings,” it authorized the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), a division of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), to issue guidance.  In response to this charge, 
HRSA drafted the Women’s Preventative Service Guidelines, which states 
that non-exempt employers must cover “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling” with no cost sharing.6  
These regulations became known as the contraceptive mandate.  HRSA 
also created certain exemptions for religious non-profit organizations and 
grandfathered plans.7 
                                                                                                                                      
5 42 U.S.C. § 300u-11 (2010). 
6 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 
Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
7 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Jun. 30, 2014). 
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In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, three closely held organizations 
challenged their obligations under the contraceptive mandate as violating 
their sincerely held religious beliefs pursuant to the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).  RFRA forbids the Federal Government from 
taking actions that substantially burden religious exercise unless that action 
is the least restrictive means to serve a compelling government interest.  
Justice Alito drafted the majority opinion.  First, the Court held that 
RFRA’s definition of a person includes corporations and that corporate 
entities are capable of religious exercise.8  Addressing whether for-profit 
corporations could hold sincere religious beliefs, the Court stated that 
“[t]he companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each 
owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has 
disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.”9  Turning to the substantial 
burden inquiry, the Court noted that failing to offer contraception would 
result in tax penalties of one hundred dollars per day for each affected 
individual.10  It also acknowledged that the companies could drop coverage 
altogether but that they would be subject to the no-offer penalty,11 
described in the following Sub-Part.12  (Amici suggested that stopping 
coverage and paying the penalty might actually be a cost-efficient decision 
for employers, a possibility alluded to in Part II of this Essay.13)  After 
finding that the contraceptive mandate posed a substantial burden on 
religious exercise, the Court then turned to the compelling interest and least 
restrictive means analysis.14  Assuming—but not holding—that the 
Government has compelling interests in public health and gender equality, 
the Court asserted that HHS failed to demonstrate that it could not achieve 
its objectives through means that would not substantially burden the 
exercise of religion, especially given the accommodations already built into 
the regulations.15  In sum, the Court’s 5-4 majority opinion held that the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations with 
religious objections, violated RFRA.16 
                                                                                                                                      
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 7-8. 
11 Id. at 8. 
12 Infra notes 51-53. 
13 Infra note 85. 
14 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Jun. 
30, 2014). 
15 Id. at 2-3. 
16 Id. at 3. 
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 Several other justices filed their own opinions in the case.  Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, responding to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, first 
stated that both sides agree that the purpose of RFRA is to protect religious 
freedom.17  In discussing the Court’s application of the substantial burden 
test, he emphasized that the majority premised its analysis on the 
assumption that the contraceptive mandate furthers a legitimate and 
compelling government interest.18  Justice Kennedy explained that a direct 
mandate to provide coverage for contraception is not the least restrictive 
way to achieve those interests because an accommodation is available for 
religious objections that would allow access to contraception without 
infringing on religious beliefs.19 
 In Justice Ginsburg’s fiery dissent, she framed the issue as a matter 
of women’s rights, asserting that the Court held “RFRA demands 
accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the 
impact that accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the 
corporation owners’ religious beliefs—in these cases thousands of women 
employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those 
corporations employ.”20  She first described the constitutional right to 
reproductive freedom, the existing cost disparities for women’s preventive 
health care, and the ACA’s and its accompanying regulations’ requirement 
that insurers cover women’s preventive health services with no cost 
sharing.21  Justice Ginsburg then went on to critique the Court’s extension 
of RFRA’s protections to for-profit corporations.22  Even if for-profit 
corporations meet the definition of “person” for RFRA purposes, she 
maintained that those entities must still demonstrate that following the 
contraceptive mandate “substantially burdens” the business’s exercise of 
religion,23 noting that the substantiality of a burden is a separate inquiry 
from the sincerity of a belief.24  She concluded that “the connection 
between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage 
requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial.”25  However, even 
assuming a substantial burden, Justice Ginsburg believed the Government 
had compelling interests in both public health and the well-being of 
                                                                                                                                      
17 Id. at 1 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
18 Id. at 2. 
19 Id. at 3. 
20 Id. at 2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 10-11. 
24 Id. at 11. 
25 Id. at 22. 
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women.26  With regard to RFRA’s least restrictive means test, she opined 
that no less restrictive yet equally effective policy would simultaneously 
satisfy the plaintiff’s religious objections and accomplish the contraceptive 
mandate’s goal of ensuring that women receive costless preventative care.27  
She elaborated that “[i]mpeding women’s receipt of benefits ‘by requiring 
them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new [government-
funded and administered] health benefit’ was scarcely what Congress 
contemplated.”28  Justice Ginsberg ended her dissent by asserting that when 
entities with religious beliefs enter commerce they accept that their beliefs 
will not be imposed on others engaging in that commercial activity.29  She 
would, therefore, have limited RFRA’s religious exemptions to 
organizations with a religious purpose, primarily engaged in conduct to 
further that purpose.30 
 Finally, Justices Breyer and Kagan wrote a mercifully short dissent 
explaining that, while they agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s assessment that 
the plaintiffs should have failed on the merits, they did not believe that it 
was necessary to reach the issue whether for-profit corporations or their 
owners can bring RFRA claims.31 
 Politicians and the media depicted Hobby Lobby as an epic clash 
between two cherished American constitutional rights (and their passionate 
advocates).  The case might as well have been called Reproductive Choice 
v. Religious Freedom.  Prior to the decision, Senator Elizabeth Warren 
commented: “I cannot believe that we live in a world where we would even 
consider letting some big corporation deny the women who work for it 
access to the basic medical tests, treatments or prescriptions that they need 
based on vague moral objections.”32  Republican Senators had their own 
view, explaining in their amicus brief, “[t]his case does not implicate the 
individual right to access to contraceptives, which this Court’s cases have 
long protected.  Instead, it concerns whether the federal government can 
force employers to violate their good-faith religious belief and pay for the 
contraceptives of others.”33  The central issue was thus framed in terms of 
reproductive health and religious freedom. 
                                                                                                                                      
26 Id. at 23-24. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.at 28. 
29 Id. at 31-35. 
30 Id. at 35. 
31 Id. at 1. (Breyer, J. and Kagan, J., dissenting). 
32 Elizabeth Warren, We Don’t Run this Country for Corporations (Mar. 26, 
2014), http://elizabethwarren.com/blog/we-dont-run-this-country-for-corporations. 
33 Brief for Senator Ted Cruz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
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 After the decision, politicians continued to weigh in on the side of 
either women’s health care or religious rights.  House Speaker John 
Boehner issued this statement:  
 
Today’s decision is a victory for religious freedom and 
another defeat for an administration that has repeatedly 
crossed constitutional lines in pursuit of its Big 
Government objectives. The mandate overturned today 
would have required for-profit companies to choose 
between violating their constitutionally-protected faith or 
paying crippling fines, which would have forced them to 
lay off employees or close their doors.34 
 
On the other side of the debate, Minority Leader Representative Nancy 
Pelosi weighed in: 
Today, the Supreme Court took an outrageous step against 
the rights of America’s women, setting a dangerous 
precedent that could permit for-profit corporations to pick 
and choose which laws to obey.  This deeply misguided 
and destructive decision is a serious blow to Americans’ 
ability to make their own health decisions.35 
 
The media echoed this framing.  One article described the case as a 
“victory at the court [sic] for the religious right.”36  Another, discussing the 
aftermath of the case, queried what would be the “next fronts in the 
contraception fight.”37 
 In his insightful article, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 
Brendan S. Maher interrogates the popular construction of the Hobby 
                                                                                                                                      
3, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, slip op. 6 (2015). 
34 Speaker Boehner on the Supreme Court’s HHS Mandate Ruling (June 30, 
2014) http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-supreme-court-s-hhs-
mandate-ruling#sthash.b56Pq4wH.dpuf. 
35 Press Release, Pelosi Statement on Supreme Court Hobby Lobby Decision, 
(June 30, 2014), http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/pelosi-statement-on-
supreme-court-hobby-lobby-decision. 
36 Richard Wolf, Justices Rule for Hobby Lobby on Contraception Mandate, 
USA TODAY, Jun. 30, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/06 
/30/supreme-court-hobby-lobby-religion-contraception-obama/11473189/. 
37 Jaime Fuller, After Hobby Lobby: The Next Fronts in the Contraception 
Fight, WASH. POST, Jul. 1, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/07/01/after-hobby-lobby-the-next-fronts-in-the-contraception-fight/. 
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Lobby case.38  He notes that many commentators stated the issue in the case 
was whether private employers should “pay” for their employees’ 
contraception.39  Maher proposes that this framing misses key nuances of 
the employer-provided system.40  Mainly, as he explains, “[e]mployers are 
not paying for contraception in the sense that many of the accounts 
assumed; they are administering a plan that passes employee money along 
to an insurer who provides coverage that includes contraception.”41  Maher 
asserts that to be compelled to be an administrator is a very different 
obligation than being compelled to spend money that would otherwise 
belong to the employer.42 
 But regardless of one’s beliefs regarding contraceptive access or 
religion, these conflicts and commentaries raise a bigger question: Why are 
employers making decisions about health-insurance coverage in the first 
place? 
 
B. EMPLOYER-PROVIDED BENEFITS & THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
  
 The central conflict in Hobby Lobby would not have occurred 
absent the American reliance on employer-provided benefits.  Of primary 
interest to this Essay is the crucial role employers occupy by providing 
private health insurance to millions of individuals in the United States.43  
Despite the varied ways of obtaining coverage, a majority of non-elderly 
Americans are insured through their employers.44  When the ACA passed, 
                                                                                                                                      
38 Brendan Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 1257 (2016). 
39 Id. Cf. James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1565 (framing Hobby Lobby in terms of which organizations should be able to 
assert rights of conscience). 
40 Maher, supra note 38. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 The U.S. is the only country that relies heavily on employers to provide 
health insurance.  Jacob S. Hacker, Dismantling the Health Care State? Political 
Institutions, Public Policies and the Comparative Politics of Health Reform, 34 
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 693, 697 (2004). 
44 Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Oct. 
5, 2015), http://kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-
population/; Melissa Majerol et al., The Uninsured:  A Primer – Key Facts About 
Health Insurance and the Uninsured in America [hereinafter The Uninsured: A 
Primer], KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 13, 2015); Diane Rowland & Adele 
Shartzer, America’s Uninsured: The Statistics and Back Story, 36 J. L. MED. & 
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one-hundred fifty-seven million Americans had employer-provided health 
insurance.45  At the time, approximately fifty-six percent of individuals 
under the age of sixty-five hold such policies,46 which made employers the 
primary source of health insurance for individuals who are not covered by 
Medicare.47  The proportion of individuals insured through their employers 
has led one author to refer to employer-provided benefits as “the primary 
source of Americans’ health insurance for most of the past century”48 and 
others to call employer-provided coverage “the bedrock of the health 
insurance system.”49  Thus, employers are a primary source of health 
insurance in the United States.   
 While employers voluntarily began offering health insurance to 
their employees as the result of World War II wage controls and favorable 
tax status,50 the ACA further entrenched our dependence on employer-
provided benefits.  Among the ACA’s most controversial provisions was 
the law’s so-called “employer mandate.” That provision requires large 
employers—defined in the law those that employ more than fifty 
workers—to offer affordable coverage of minimum value to ninety-five 
percent of their “full-time” employees, employees who work thirty or more 
hours per week.51  Lower-wage workers—individuals whose income is 
                                                                                                                                      
ETHICS 618, (2008). 
45 Mark Merlis, The Affordable Care Act and Employer-Sponsored Insurance 
for Working Americans, ACAD. HEALTH 1 (2011), http://www.academyhealth.org/ 
files/nhpc/2011/AH_2011AffordableCareReportFINAL3.pdf. 
46 The Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44.  Medicare covers almost all 
Americans over age sixty-five.  
47 Rowland & Shartzer, supra note 44, at 621. 
48 Christine Eibner, Employer-Provided Health Insurance: Why Does It 
Persist, and Will It Continue after 2014?, NEW ENG. J. MED. SUPP. (2003), 
available at http://images.nejm.org/editorial/supplementary/2013/hbr18-eibner.pdf. 
49 See Rowland & Shartzer, supra note 44, at 619.  Employer-provided 
benefits have also been referred to as the “cornerstone” of the American health-
care system.  See John Bronsteen et al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of 
Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2298-99 (2008). 
50 Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health Insurance 
After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 885, 888 
(2011) [hereinafter Employment-Based].  Unions and the return of the military 
were also arguably contributing factors.  For a thorough discussion of the history 
of the development of the employer-provided benefits system, see id. at 886-92. 
51 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253-56 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H); see also The Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44.  
However, not all scholars agree the mandate truly operates as such.  See, e.g., 
Kathryn Moore, The Pay or Play Penalty Under the Affordable Care Act: 
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lower than four-hundred percent of the federal poverty level—may qualify 
for a refundable tax credit to purchase insurance for themselves and their 
dependents.52  If an employer fails to offer a health plan and just one of its 
employees purchases subsidized coverage on an exchange, the employer 
will face a tax of up to two-thousand dollars for each full-time employee, 
not counting the first thirty employees.53  Likewise, if an employer offers a 
health plan but the plan is not affordable—either the required contribution 
exceeds 9.5 percent of an employee’s income or the plan pays for less than 
sixty percent of the covered services—and a qualifying employee obtains 
tax-subsidized coverage on an exchange, then the employer must pay a 
three thousand dollar penalty for each subsidized employee who purchases 
coverage.54  Thus, the “pay-or-play penalty” actually encompasses two 
related tax penalties: the “no offer penalty” and the “unaffordable coverage 
penalty.”55 
However, the employer mandate is not the only way in which the 
ACA creates incentives for employers to provide health insurance. Because 
of the limitations of the small-group system, small employers have 
historically been far less likely to offer insurance to their employees.56  
Hence, a substantial portion of the uninsured who are part of working 
families work (or have a family member who works) for a small 
employer.57  Although the mandate does not apply to small employers, the 
                                                                                                                                      
Emerging Issues (in progress) [hereinafter Pay or Play]. 
52 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213-20 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B); Merlis, supra note 45, at 45. 
53 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253-56 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H); Merlis, supra note 45, at 2; see also The 
Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44.  Some employers have thus assumed that 
eighty employees is the true threshold for compliance as there will not be a 
financial impact for employees fifty to seventy-nine.  James N. Nelson, The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, ERISA § 510 and the Next Generation of 
Benefits Litigation Concerns, ABA Employee Benefits Committee Newsletter. 
54 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253-56 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H); Merlis, supra note 45, at 2. 
55 I have borrowed the terms “pay-or-play penalty,” “no offer penalty,” and 
“unaffordable coverage penalty” from Kathy Moore.  See generally Moore, Pay or 
Play, supra note 51.  Moore includes a very useful diagram in her Essay, mapping 
how the pay-or-play penalty operates.  Id. 
56 Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small Employer Health 
Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1942-44 (2013) [hereinafter Saving]. 
57 The mandate applies only to employers with fifty or more full-time 
employees.  ACA § 1513, I.R.C. § 4980(H).  By failing to cover smaller 
employers, the mandate could leave a number of individuals uninsured.  See The 
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law addresses this issue via tax credits designed to help smaller entities—
employers with less than twenty-five employees and annual wages under 
fifty thousand dollars—cover the costs of providing health insurance to 
their workers.58  These credits became available the year the law passed;59 
however, no credits are available after the start of this year.60  Given the 
modest nature of the credits and the short lifespan of the program, there is 
speculation that this incentive will do little to encourage small employers to 
offer coverage when they haven’t in the past.61  Yet regardless of their 
impact they provide another example of how the ACA not only perpetuates 
but attempts to strengthen the American reliance on employer-provided 
benefits. 
 In sum, while a vast majority of employers were already offering 
health insurance to their employees prior to health-care reform,62 the ACA 
further codified our dependence on employers as health-insurance 
providers through the employer mandate and other provisions designed to 
encourage employers to provide insurance.  Without the employer-provided 
benefits system there would be no Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.  As a result, 
this Essay advocates understanding Hobby Lobby as primarily a case about 
the continued reliance on employers to provide health insurance and the 
shortcomings of the employer-provided system. 
 
* * * 
 
Commentators framed Burwell v. Hobby Lobby as the religious 
right and the socially liberal left locking horns on the issue of women’s 
                                                                                                                                      
Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44 (explaining that “the employer requirements 
may help many uninsured individuals with a worker in their family, a majority of 
uninsured workers work in small firms that are not required to provide insurance 
coverage”). 
58 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1421, 124 Stat. 119, 237-42 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 45R); I.R.C. § 45R(d); Merlis, supra note 45, at 3; The 
Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44; see also Moore, Employment-Based, supra 
note 50, 912-17 (describing the tax credit and assessing its probable effect). 
59 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1421, 124 Stat. 119, 237-42 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 45R); The Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44. 
60 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1421, 124 Stat. 119, 237-42 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 45R); Merlis, supra note 45, at 3. 
61 Merlis, supra note 45, at 3. 
62 Rowland & Shartzer, supra note 44, at 621; see also Merlis, supra note 45, 
at 3 (“In 2010, 95 percent of firms with 50 to 199 workers and 99 percent of firms 
with 200 or more workers offered coverage to at least some of their employees.”). 
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reproductive health.  Yet this construction only tells part of the story.  If 
read as an employer-provided benefits case, Hobby Lobby is about much 
more than just access to contraception.  Employers make numerous choices 
that impact how a substantial number of Americans access health care.  
Hence, Part II argues that the employer-provided system renders employers 
de facto health-care policy makers. 
 
II. EMPLOYERS AS HEALTH-CARE POLICY MAKERS 
 
Employers make all kinds of decisions that impact how a 
substantial number of Americans access health care.  In other words, they 
are making health-care policy.  Employers act as health-care policy makers 
in two related ways: as gatekeepers and as regulators.  As gatekeepers, 
employers affect whether people have access to health care.  Their 
decisions to offer benefits or to dump potentially costly employees may 
determine whether certain people can access the health-care system at all.  
As regulators, employers affect how people access health care.  The 
structure of their plans, the kind of coverage they offer, and whether they 
include cost-sharing mechanisms can all impact how an individual obtains 
health care.   
A.  EMPLOYERS AS GATEKEEPERS 
 Health care in the United States is expensive.  America spends 
approximately eight thousand dollars per person each year on health care63 
and that number continues to rise.64  This amount is more than two and a 
half times as much as other developed countries.65  Because rising costs 
render health care unaffordable, many people in the United States must 
depend on health insurance to finance their medical treatment.  Thus, 
having insurance may in many circumstances be a prerequisite for 
                                                                                                                                      
63 Jason Kane, Health Costs: How the U.S. Compares with Other Countries, 
PBS Newshour, Oct. 22, 2012, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/health-costs-how-the-us-compares-with-
other-countries/ (stating that the United States pays $8,233 per person each year); 
see also id. (explaining that the next highest spenders all spent at least $3,000 and 
the average annual spending for developed countries was $3,268 per person 
(quoting Mark Pearson)). 
64 Annie Lowery, Health Care Spending’s Recent Surge Stirs Unease, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 19, 2014. 
65 Id.; Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2013. 
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accessing needed health care.  To be sure, having health insurance does not 
alone promise access to good health care, but lacking insurance certainly 
impedes it.66  In short, being uninsured affects whether, when, and where 
individuals access the health-care system.67  Employers act as gatekeepers 
to health care in their decisions to offer benefits and to engage in employee 
dumping. 
 
1.  Whether to Offer Benefits 
 
While employer-provided benefits are a crucial component of the 
American health insurance system, not all workers receive health insurance 
from their employers.  Some employees, such as part-time workers, may 
not be offered health insurance, and, even of the ones that are, not all can 
afford to pay their portion of the premiums.68  While some uninsured 
workers may be employed part-time or as independent contractors, the 
majority are either self-employed or work for small employers who do not 
offer benefits.69  Employers in certain industries are less likely to offer their 
employees coverage.70  Significantly, over eighty percent of uninsured 
workers have blue-collar jobs.71  Hence, not all workers have historically 
been eligible for coverage and even if they qualify, the policies themselves 
may be prohibitively expensive.  Perhaps surprisingly given the reliance on 
employers to provide health insurance, three-quarters of the uninsured are 
actually part of working families.72  Employers, therefore, have rarely 
insured all of their employees.  On average, they have covered seventy-
                                                                                                                                      
66 Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, 
Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 25 (2010).. 
67 Rowland & Shartzer, supra note 44, at 618. 
68 Id. at 621; see also Key Facts, supra note 44; The Uninsured: A Primer, 
supra note 44. 
69 Key Facts, supra note 44. 
70 Id.  Individuals who work in manufacturing, professional services, and the 
public sector are more likely to receive employer-provided benefits.  Id. 
71 Id. 
72 The Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44.  Approximately 60% of the 
uninsured have at least one full-time worker in the family and 16% have at least 
one part-time worker.  Id; Key Facts, supra note 44; see also The Uninsured: A 
Primer, supra note 44 (reporting the numbers as 66.7% and 20.2%, respectively); 
Rowland & Shartzer, supra note 44, at 620 (reporting the numbers at 70% and 
11%, respectively). 
98  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 22.1 
 
seven percent of their workers.73  Yet when employers do offer health 
insurance, their employees are highly likely to take them up on it.74 
Several employer-provided plans have historically excluded some 
of their full-time employees, usually those individuals who make less 
money.75  As a group, low-income workers are less likely to be covered 
through their employers than their high-income counterparts.76  Of course, 
the ACA will change the way in which employers can limit the coverage 
they provide to some extent.  As mentioned, the employer mandate requires 
large employers to provide insurance to all of their full-time employees or 
face a penalty. 
Recently, employers have had a potentially restrictive effect on 
health-care access by reducing the benefits available to individuals who are 
not the employee.  In particular, employers have begun cutting coverage for 
working spouses who have access to health insurance through their own 
jobs, following the passing of the ACA.77  These cuts have taken different 
forms.  Whereas some employers have added a surcharge or increased the 
employee’s share of the premium for spousal coverage, others have simply 
eliminated it.78  Employers have reduced coverage for working spouses for 
explicitly cost-related reasons.79  For example, UPS maintained it would 
save a whopping sixty million dollars per year by cutting benefits for 
spouses who are eligible for health insurance through their own 
employers.80 
Even after the ACA, employers will not necessarily uniformly 
offer coverage to their employees.  Recall that the mandate does not apply 
to smaller employers and the tax credits designed to facilitate their entrance 
into the market ended in 2015.  Consequently, employers of fewer than 
fifty that have not previously offered health insurance to their employees 
have little added incentive to start now. Indeed, they could arguably have 
less incentive, given that employees can now purchase often heavily 
subsidized policies on the exchanges. Additionally, larger employers could 
still decide not to offer their employees coverage and nominally comply 
with the law.  One way that employers could avoid the requirements of the 
                                                                                                                                      
73 The Uninsured: A Primer, supra note 44. 
74 Id. 
75 Merlis, supra note 45, at 4. 
76 Moore, Employment-Based, supra note 50, at 896. 
77 Moore, Pay or Play, supra note 51. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (citing Jay Hancock, UPS Won’t Insure Spouses of Many Employees, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2013)). 
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ACA would be to keep their number of full-time employees below the 
employer mandate’s fifty full-time workers threshold.  Employers right at 
the cusp of the mandate could opt not to hire new workers81 or to hire new 
workers exclusively on a part-time or contract basis.82 Employers whose 
workforce already exceeds fifty employees could either fire enough 
employees to put them below the cut-off83 or could switch certain 
employees to part-time or contract work.84  Alternatively, employers might 
opt to drop coverage altogether and instead pay the relatively modest tax 
penalties.85 
How an employer’s decision about offering benefits will affect the 
health-care access of its employees depends on the individual employee’s 
income and the scope of the coverage the employer would have offered.  
As explained in Part I, thanks to the ACA, lower-income workers have 
access to highly subsidized health insurance on the exchanges.86  On one 
hand, if an employee can get cheaper and/or more generous coverage than 
she would have received from her employer via the exchanges the 
employer’s decision not to offer benefits will not have a harmful impact.  
Paradoxically, the employee might actually end up better off in the long 
run.  (She will of course have to deal with administrative hassle of having 
to switch insurance carriers, which could disrupt her access to health care, 
particularly if it occurs mid-treatment.)  On the other hand, if an individual 
does not qualify for the tax credit or other government benefits and/or the 
coverage available to her on the exchanges is less comprehensive, the 
absence of employer-provided benefits might deny her access to health 
care.  For example, a person without employer-provided benefits who finds 
herself in the Medicaid gap could end up without meaningful access to 
health care.87  Of course, another factor to consider is that policies 
                                                                                                                                      
81 Moore, Pay or Play, supra note 51. 
82 However, a recent article in Health Affairs only found marginal evidence in 
favor of an increased reliance on part-time workers.  See Asako S. Moriya, Thomas 
M. Selden, & Kosali I. Simon, Little Change Seen In Part-Time Employment As A 
Result Of The Affordable Care Act, 35 HEALTH AFFAIRS 119 (2016). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Merlis, supra note 45, at 1.  That said, the tax penalties are not themselves 
tax deductible, while the premiums are, which means that the penalties could be 
substantially larger than they first appear. 
86 Supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
87 Medicaid may also be an option for some but with the piecemeal enactment 
of the Medicaid expansion and the gap it creates between public benefits and the 
availability of subsidies in some states, people may find themselves in a 
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purchased on the exchanges are not tax-deductible, while employer-
provided benefits are (at least to a point), which may also affect the relative 
desirability of an exchange policy versus an employer-provided one. 
2.  Targeted Employee Dumping 
 An employer could also act as a gatekeeper by excluding certain 
employees.  But why would employers want to offer health insurance to 
some employees but not others?  The answer is simple: cost.  By denying 
benefits to potentially expensive employees, employers can theoretically 
save on health insurance costs.  Moreover, employers can make themselves 
more competitive by passing on some of the savings to workers in the form 
of higher pay.  Amy Monahan and Dan Schwarcz refer to this practice as 
“targeted dumping.”88  Employers can engage in both explicit and in 
structural employee dumping behaviors. 
 Explicit dumping practices are relatively straightforward.  An 
employer who does not wish to offer insurance to a potentially expensive 
employee could fire her, switch her to part-time or contract work to avoid 
the employer mandate, or not hire her to begin with.  A handful of cases 
indicate that at least a few employers have engaged in this type of 
conduct.89  Encouraging a potentially expensive employee to voluntarily 
leave a health plan is a less dramatic explicit dumping strategy.  For 
example, one woman reported that after she had prophylactic surgeries due 
to a heightened genetic risk of breast cancer, her boss yelled at her at work 
for increasing the yearly cost of the health policy by $13,000, asked her to 
switch to her husband’s insurance, and offered her additional compensation 
to leave the employer-provided plan.90 
In addition to explicit employee dumping, employers may also 
adopt subtler strategies specifically geared to shunt potentially costly 
individuals off their health plans.  I call this phenomenon “structural 
                                                                                                                                      
Goldilocks dilemma.  They could be too poor to afford health insurance yet too 
wealthy to qualify for Medicaid or the low-income subsidy. 
88 Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health 
Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 128 (2011) 
[hereinafter Dumping]. 
89 See JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS LEONARD, HEALTHISM: 
HEALTH-STATUS DISCRIMINATION & THE LAW (forthcoming Cambridge 
University Press 2018). 
90 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: 
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y 14-15 (2004). 
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employee dumping.”  This variety of targeted dumping operates through 
“subtle, informal pressure” not outright coercion.91  Monahan and 
Schwarcz explain that employers can dump potentially expensive 
employees from their health plans using “indirect risk classification.”  
Indirect risk classification does not rely upon the employer’s differentiating 
between high and low-risk employees but rather creates situations in which 
the individuals themselves will self-classify based on risk through their 
decisions related to health insurance.92   
Employers can achieve this goal through both positive and negative 
signals.  On one hand, they could adopt plans that offer significant benefits 
related to wellness, such as joining a gym or maintaining a healthy blood 
pressure or weight, thereby encouraging low-risk employees to accept 
coverage.93  On the other, the plans could include high deductibles and 
exclude drugs and treatments associated with chronic conditions, thus 
creating incentives for high-risk employees to seek health insurance 
elsewhere.94   
Employers could also go as far as advising their high-risk 
employees that those individuals may have better coverage going through 
the exchanges.95  Thus, after adopting policies with elements designed to 
attract low-risk employees and discourage high-risk ones, employers can 
explain to the high-risk employees why it is in their self-interest not to 
accept the employer-provided plan because outside health insurance would 
better meet their medical needs.  Remarkably, the ACA does very little to 
combat targeted dumping, especially by self-insured employers.96  Despite 
the polarized reaction to health-care reform, Monahan and Schwarcz argue 
that people of all political and ideological stripes should agree that gaming 
the system through targeted dumping is an undesirable outcome.97 
Like the impact of the decision whether to offer benefits, the effect 
of targeted employee dumping also depends on the individual employee’s 
income (i.e., access to subsidies) and the relative desirability of the policies 
available on the exchanges as compared to the policies provided by the 
employer.  If a dumped individual can access more affordable and/or 
expansive coverage on the exchanges, the effect could be neutral, even 
                                                                                                                                      
91 Monahan & Schwarcz, Dumping, supra note 88, at 171. 
92 Id. at 134-35. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 171. 
96 Id. at 146. 
97 Id. at 132. 
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preferable.    If she cannot, it is problematic.  Moreover, it is worth noting 
that dumping that affects employment, such as failing to hire, firing, or 
switching to part-time or contract work, will have the added negative 
impact of reducing the wages available to purchase health care out-of-
pocket. 
 
B. EMPLOYERS AS REGULATORS 
 
Employers’ gatekeeping function is all-or-nothing: Either the 
employee has access to meaningful employer-provided coverage, or she 
does not.  If an individual without employer-provided benefits also cannot 
obtain coverage on the exchanges or afford to purchase health care on her 
own, she may find herself effectively shut out of the health-care system.  
Yet as regulators, employers make decisions that have a more subtle impact 
on health-care access by shaping the conditions under which their 
employees obtain care.98 In other words, they can affect how their 
employees access health care.  The affected individuals could end up 
under-insured—that is they nominally hold health insurance but are still 
unable to access needed health care—or they might choose one treatment 
option or medical professional over another, not for health related reasons 
but because of their coverage.  This Sub-Part explores three ways in which 
employers regulate health-care access: plan structure; scope of coverage; 
and cost-sharing.99 
1.  Plan Structure 
The types of plans employers choose to offer their employees 
shape how those covered individuals access the health-care system.  
Employers may choose from a variety of benefits structures when offering 
                                                                                                                                      
98 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Individual Mandate as Healthcare 
Regulation: What the Obama Administration Should Have Said in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 39 AMER. J. L. & MED. 539, 541 (2013) (explaining that health insurance 
“imposes regulatory constraints on individual consumption decisions, steering 
beneficiaries toward particular goods and services”). 
99 Matthew identified a similar list of strategies.  Dayna Bowen Matthew, 
Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: 
Markets, Courts and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 
1045-49 (1996) (identifying four major approaches that employers have taken to 
manage health insurance costs).  Matthew cites adopting plans with cost-sharing 
provisions, limiting coverage for costly individuals, self-insuring, and opting not to 
offer coverage.  Id. 
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health-insurance coverage to their employees.  Typical health plan 
structures include indemnity plans, preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs), point-of-service plans (POSs), health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), and finally accountable care organizations (ACOs).  Yet while 
employers enjoy significant choice in selecting which health plans to offer 
they tend to provide only one or two options to their employees.100  
Indemnity plans are the simplest.  They indemnify the insured from 
the costs of health care.101  Few cost-limiting mechanisms existed under 
such plans and the insurance company typically paid on the billed amount, 
leaving the provider to recoup any additional costs from the insured.102  
While these kinds of plans were common before the managed-care 
revolution of the 1980s and early 1990s, they now make up only one 
percent of the current health-insurance market.103 
Common plan structures include PPOs, HMOs, POSs, and ACOs. 
PPOs are currently the most popular variety of managed-care plans.104  
PPOs contract with a network of “preferred” health-care providers who 
agree to the plan’s payment structure.105  The PPO pays the providers 
directly for their services.106  HMOs not only handle benefits coverage but 
also create and maintain the very health-care delivery system itself.107  The 
vast majority of HMOs contract with health systems and hospitals 
directly.108  Because they are licensed by the states, HMOs must comply 
with more rules and regulations than other types of plans, such as providing 
adequate access to health-care providers and permitting direct access to 
PCPs.109  Importantly, HMOs typically share some degree of risk with their 
physician network.110  POSs combine characteristics of managed-care and 
indemnity plans by allowing insureds to choose which type of benefits they 
want to use when they access health care, or at the “point of service.”111  
These plans allow employers to capitalize on the cost-savings of an HMO-
                                                                                                                                      
100 Margaux J. Hall, A Fiduciary Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1729, 1741 (2014); Robertson, Cost-Sharing, supra note 145. 
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style plan while still allowing some coverage for out-of-network health-
care services.112  Finally, because of the backlash against traditional 
managed care organizations, the ACA ushered in a new variety of managed 
care: ACOs.113 As with HMOs, in ACOs, participating providers agree to 
share the responsibility for a group of patients in terms of both financial 
risk and health-care delivery.114  However, ACOs differ from HMOs 
because they are provider-led and are designed to guarantee both efficient 
and effective care.  While the primary payment incentives with respect to 
HMOs are financial, ACOs also introduce a quality standard. ACOs adopt 
an alternate payment structure designed not only to reward economic 
efficiency but also quality of care.115 
The type of plan an employer selects can have a direct effect on 
how its employees access health care.  For example, in a PPO, insureds 
who seek care in network receive certain benefits,116 thereby pushing them 
toward the providers who have agreed to the terms of the PPO.  If a 
person’s top choice of health-care provider has not agreed to the terms of 
the PPO, that individual may be inclined to instead seek care in-network.  
PPOs therefore limit individual choice and shape where insureds ultimately 
access health care.  Similarly, the indemnity-style coverage of POSs tends 
to incorporate steep cost-sharing mechanisms to encourage individuals to 
seek care in network.117  Further, to access the highest degree of coverage 
for non-emergency treatment, individuals in POSs must first go through 
their primary-care physician (PCP).118  Hence, like PPOs, POSs push 
individuals toward certain providers.  Additionally, requiring a PCP visit 
prior to specialty care structures the way in which insureds access health 
care by restricting their ability to independently seek care from specialists. 
HMOs, like the other kinds of managed-care plans, also restrict 
where insureds can access health care.  Even post-ACA, employers—self-
insured and otherwise—are more or less able to craft their provider 
networks however they choose.119  Those choices can have far-reaching 
implications for patient access.  Frequently, participants must access care in 
network and must go through a designated PCP before obtaining 
                                                                                                                                      
112 Id. 
113 See generally Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We 
Have Our Cake and Eat it Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393 (2012) 
114 Id. at 1410-12. 
115 Id. at 1410. 
116 KONGSTVEDT, supra note 101. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Monahan & Schwarcz, Dumping, supra note 88, at 149. 
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specialized care.120  Seeing out-of-network specialists may prove 
particularly challenging.  For example, the plan might require PCP pre-
approval or a referral from an in network provider or might cap the number 
of times that a participant can see an out-of-network specialist.121  Thus, 
insureds face two types of limitations.  First, to fully enjoy the benefit of 
their health-insurance coverage they must seek care from a predetermined 
group of health-care providers, regardless of whether a physician outside 
the network could better meet their needs.  Second, they cannot simply see 
a particular doctor—in network or not—when they please.  They must go 
through the steps of acquiring referrals or pre-approvals to be covered in 
many circumstances.  These restrictions significantly limit patients in their 
choices of which provider they see and when they see them.  And that is no 
accident.  Managed care plans are designed to funnel patients to particular 
clinics and physicians and through particular treatment channels to keep 
costs low.  However, increasingly narrow networks can have a negative 
effect on health-care access, especially for the very sick.122  
Moreover, given the payment structure and risk-sharing aspects of 
HMOs, physicians have incentives to favor lower cost treatment options for 
the patients.123  Capitation, a common mechanism for encouraging health-
care providers to cut costs, can have a restrictive effect on health-care 
access.124  Pursuant to a capitation regime, the insurer gives the physician a 
predetermined amount of money for treating a plan participant over a 
particular time span.125  If the treatment costs are less than the payment, the 
physician keeps the overage.126  If they are more, the physician receives no 
additional compensation.127  Clearly, the incentive is to provide health care 
at as little cost as possible to retain the maximum share of the capitation 
payment.  Therefore, a doctor may not recommend a particular procedure 
or course of treatment—even if it has therapeutic benefit—thereby 
restricting the patient’s choice of covered treatment options.  Moreover, a 
patient may not even know a treatment alternative exists if she depends on 
                                                                                                                                      
120 Id. at 168. 
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122 See generally Valarie Blake, Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health 
Insurance and Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 63 (2015). 
123 Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2318. 
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her physician to inform her.128  This scenario is particularly problematic 
because the patient, being unaware of the full panoply of possible 
treatments, does not even have the choice to pay out-of-pocket for a more 
expensive option.  As a result, the use of financial incentives to encourage 
health-care providers to factor cost into their treatment recommendations 
has been cited as an example of the agency problems described in Part 
III.129  ACOs may also encourage health-care providers to offer less 
expensive treatment options, thereby restricting choice in health care and, 
as a result, potentially denying patients access to medically beneficial 
care.130 
In sum, the types of plans employers choose to offer their 
employees can have a significant impact on the conditions under which 
those individuals access health care.  In particular, the plan structure can 
dictate which kinds of medical professionals a person can consult, when, 
and for what price.131  These constraints are designed primarily to reduce 
costs, including wasteful medical spending, but not necessarily to ensure 
access or improve health-care delivery.   
 
2.  Scope of Coverage 
 
 Employers have discretion with respect to the scope of the benefits 
they offer.  Small-group insurers, like those on the individual market, must 
offer federally determined essential health benefits.132  Although large 
employer-provided and self-insured plans need not provide all ten of the 
essential benefits like their individual and small-group compatriots, they 
are subject to certain requirements in terms of both coverage and 
affordability.133  However, because coverage and affordability are both 
                                                                                                                                      
128 Id. 
129 Id.; Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2317 (asserting that such systems 
could “incentivize physicians to underprovide care”). 
130 Mantel, supra note 113, at 1427.  Of course, more expensive treatment is 
not necessarily better. 
131 Moncrieff, supra note 98, at 552-53 (describing ways in which insurance 
coverage shapes health-care decisions through its pricing structure and 
administrative requirements). 
132 Specifically, the ACA imposes coverage requirements on plans in the 
individual and small-group markets.  See Monahan & Schwarcz, Saving, supra 
note 56, at 1945-46. 
133 See Allison Hoffman, Health Care Spending and Financial Security After 
the Affordable Care Act, 92 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2014) [hereinafter Health Care 
Spending] (describing the relatively loose regulation of employer-provided health 
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described in terms of the cost of the plan, those requirements do not 
mandate particular substantive benefits.134  Thus, large-group and self-
insured employer-provided plans maintain significant freedom regarding 
what they choose to cover.135  As Amy Monahan and Dan Schwarcz point 
out, a self-insured employer could lawfully implement a health plan that 
covers only preventive services, the four types of coverage mandated by 
ERISA, and the routine costs of individuals in clinical trials.136  Nothing 
more.  It is also worth noting that because of the notorious promise that “if 
you like the plan you have, you can keep it,”137 plans that do not comply 
with the ACA’s requirements but were in effect before March 23, 2010 
have grandfathered status.138 Hence, while the ACA does impose some 
substantive requirements on certain types of policies, it leaves a fair 
amount of discretion for certain kinds of employers.139 
Given the leeway described above, employers with self-insured or 
large-group plans that wish to limit coverage—either for financial or, as in 
Hobby Lobby, ideological reasons—could do so in a variety of ways.  For 
example, many health insurance policies both limit their coverage to 
medically necessary treatment (the determination of which may be left to 
the insurer’s discretion) and exclude experimental options.140  Employers 
can also select plans that do not cover the treatment of certain conditions.  
                                                                                                                                      
insurance under the ACA).  Hoffman proposes that by banning caps, the ACA 
could actually discourage employers from adopting plans that cover essential 
benefits.  Id. 
134 Monahan & Schwarcz, Dumping, supra note 88, at 158 (explaining that 
neither “affordable” or “minimum value” apply to the scope of the benefits 
provided). 
135 Id. at 147  
136 Id. at 148. 
137 See Administration of Barack Obama, Statement on the Third Anniversary 
of the Signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, (Mar. 23, 2013). 
138 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1251, 124 Stat. 119, 161-62 (codified as  
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18011).  Grandfathered plans can continue to impose 
restrictions on coverage such as preexisting condition exclusions and annual and 
lifetime caps.  Yet plans can very easily lose their grandfathered status by adopting 
any number of changes.  Merlis, supra note 45, at 3. 
139 Yet where the ACA falls short in terms of benefits regulation, state law 
may do some work.  Although ERISA prevents states from regulating self-insured 
plans, it specifically allows them to impose substantive requirements on health 
insurers who provide insurance to employers and states have availed themselves of 
the opportunity by requiring insurers to cover a significant range of benefits.  
Monahan & Schwarcz, Dumping, supra note 88, at 144. 
140 Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2316 
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They could, therefore, select or design plans that exclude drugs and care for 
stigmatized or especially costly health problems, such as AIDS and 
hemophilia.141  Yet even when they provide coverage for a particular 
condition, employers and health insurers may only cover certain options for 
treating that condition.  Likewise, a policy may cover only one course of 
treatment or one aspect of the treatment process.  A policy could, therefore, 
cover tests for autism while excluding the behavioral therapy needed for 
long-term management and care, or simply cap coverage for a given 
condition at a particular amount.142  Given the discretionary and patchwork 
nature of certain health plans, it is not terribly surprising that many 
individuals with cancer report that their employer-provided plans fail to 
comprehensively cover their treatment.143  Because employees have little 
choice with respect to the content of their employer-provided plans, which 
in turn leads to little incentive to actually read coverage details carefully, 
they frequently are unaware of these gaps in benefits.  Sadly, many times, it 
is not until an individual or her family falls ill that she discovers she lacks 
coverage for a needed treatment.144   
The scope of coverage an employer offers can affect access.  First, 
individuals may forgo potentially beneficial treatments or services because 
they are not covered and the employees cannot afford to pay out-of-pocket.  
Treatments or services with therapeutic value may not be “medically 
necessary.”  Thus, even if an individual could benefit from health-care 
services, if the insurer deems the services unnecessary or experimental, that 
person may not be able to access them.  Second, individuals may be 
uninsured for certain conditions.  When an employer chooses a plan that 
does not cover a particular health condition, a covered employee may not 
seek any treatment because she cannot afford it without the help of 
insurance.  The absence of any meaningful treatment options raises 
gatekeeping concerns.  Finally, individuals may make treatment decisions 
based on coverage instead of medical opinion.  For example, a person 
                                                                                                                                      
141 See Monahan & Schwarcz, Dumping, supra note 88, at 147. 
142 See id. at 166.  Such caps could lead employees to begin treatment that they 
must eventually abandon once they reach the cap.  Hoffman, Health Care 
Spending, supra note 133. 
143 S. Yousuf Zafar et al., The Financial Toxicity of Cancer Treatment: A Pilot 
Study Assessing Out-of-Pocket Expenses and the Insured Cancer Patient’s 
Experience, THE ONCOLOGIST (2013); see also Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, 
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System, Jan. 30, 2009, available at http://kff.org/health-costs/event/spending-to-
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144 Matthew, supra note 99, at 1048. 
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might choose drug therapy over surgery even when surgery is the most 
desirable treatment option.  While they may not be as harmful as outright 
exclusion, such limitations on substantive health-insurance benefits provide 
yet another example of how employers’ decisions ultimately dictate health-
care access. 
3.  Cost-Sharing 
 
Cost-sharing mechanisms can also affect health-care access. Cost-
sharing provisions, such as including deductibles, co-payments, and co-
insurance, require individuals to pay some amount out-of-pocket to access 
the covered health care.145  The major aim of these kinds of measures is to 
reduce wasteful spending by ensuring that people have skin in the game.  
However, the same mechanisms could also discourage obtaining needed 
medical treatments because of cost. 
The ACA also creates some restrictions on cost-sharing.  For 
instance, the law requires coverage with no cost-sharing for certain 
preventive services, such as immunizations depending upon age and 
population, as well as screenings (and sometimes counseling) for various 
conditions, including alcohol misuse, diabetes, HIV, and depression.146  
Thus, employer-provided plans can theoretically no longer cut costs by 
passing a portion of those particular kinds of expenses down to the 
employees.  However, they may pass costs down to employees by making 
them pay more for coverage or by skimping in other areas.  The ACA also 
limits the maximum amount an individual can contribute in cost-sharing 
obligations for essential benefits in individual and small group plans on the 
exchanges, as well as employer-provided group plans,147 and caps cost-
                                                                                                                                      
145 Because individuals must pay up to a certain threshold before accessing 
their benefits, Christopher Robertson has aptly described cost-sharing mechanisms 
as “just the absence of insurance for certain costs.” Christopher T. Robertson, 
Scaling Cost-Sharing to Wages: How Employers Can Reduce Health Spending and 
Provide Greater Economic Security, 14 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 239 
(2014) [hereinafter Cost-Sharing]; see also Moore, Pay or Play, supra note 51; 
Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care 
Reform, YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 453, 457 (2009). 
146 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 131-32 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13); Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Preventative Services Covered 
Under the Affordable Care Act, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2010/ 
07/preventive-services-list.html. 
147 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(c), 124 Stat. 119, 165-167 (codified as 
amended 42 U.S.C. § 18022). 
110  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 22.1 
 
sharing for individual and small-group plans.148 Despite those restrictions, 
it seems that health-care reform has actually encouraged many employer-
provided health plans to increase their adoption of cost-sharing devices.  
Following the ACA, employers may start to move away from managed-
care plans, which carry with them lower out-of-pocket costs, to higher 
deductible and co-pay plans.149 
Cost-sharing mechanisms can shape how individuals access health 
care because high deductibles and co-pays may discourage them from 
seeking medical treatment when they actually need it.150  Importantly, cost-
sharing mechanisms affect workers differently.  For example, a $5000 
annual deductible is of a higher relative cost to an employee that makes 
$20,000 per year as compared to an employee who makes $100,000.  Thus, 
while deceptively facially neutral, a co-pay or deductible that fits 
comfortably within the price range of one employee might be too expensive 
for another.  As a result, some individuals may nominally hold health 
insurance from their employers but still be unable to meaningfully access 
the health-care system, leaving them under-insured.151  To cope with this 
under-insurance, they may allocate money away from other necessities152 
or forgo needed care altogether.153  Hence, from a practical perspective, 
                                                                                                                                      
148 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(c)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(1)) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii)); see also 
Monahan & Schwarcz, Saving, supra note 56, at 1946.  Interestingly, the ACA also 
originally included a provision that would have applied only to small-group plans, 
forbidding deductibles that exceed two and four thousand dollars for individual and 
family coverage, respectively, but it was repealed.  See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1302(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 166 (repealed 2014); see also Monahan & 
Schwarcz, Saving, supra note 56, at 1946. 
149 John Ydstie, More U.S. Companies Switch to High Deductible Health 
Plans, NPR (Feb. 18, 2014) http://www.npr.org/2014/02/18/278952305/there-s-
hope-health-care-costs-can-be-brought-under-control (citing Tom Mangan).  
150 Proponents of these plans contend that the benefits of discouraging insureds 
from seeking care that significantly exceeds their benefits outweighs these 
potential detriments. 
151 The differing impacts of cost-sharing also create distortions on the other 
side.  Affluent people end up over-insured because the cost-sharing mechanisms 
are not set high enough to deter them from spending and all of the care over the 
threshold amount is fully covered.  Robertson has proposed a straightforward, 
elegant solution to this problem: scaled cost-sharing.  Under such a system, cost-
sharing obligations would vary depending on an individual’s ability to pay.  
Robertson, Cost-Sharing, supra note 145. 
152 Id. at 250-51. 
153 Id. at 252. 
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being under-insured can be just as harmful as being uninsured.154  Not 
surprisingly, cost-sharing mechanisms, therefore, have a disproportionately 
negative effect on the chronically ill155 and the disabled.156 
* * * 
 
Viewed through the lens of employer-provided benefits, the real 
problem of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby is not that employers’ religious 
freedom may conflict with employees’ reproductive rights, but rather that 
private employers play a dominant role in many Americans’ access to 
health care.  After having outlined the ways in which employers shape 
health-care access, Part III proposes that less reliance on employers to 
provide health insurance could help end their reign as de facto health-care 
policy makers. 
 
III. GOING FORWARD 
 
 Hobby Lobby can be understood as being about much more than 
just access to contraception.  Employers act as both gatekeepers and 
regulators of the health-care system. So if a woman’s job should not have 
anything to do with her decisions about her reproductive health, then 
arguably her job should not have any bearing on which doctors she sees or 
which treatment she chooses.  Likewise, it is unclear why private 
employers should offer health insurance to their employees that conflicts 
with their financial or ideological interests.  Thus, the real solution to the 
Hobby Lobby problem might be a move away from the employer-provided 
benefits system.  Part III begins with a brief defense of employers and then 
turns to the uncertain future of employer-provided benefits in the wake of 
health-care reform. 
A. A BRIEF DEFENSE OF EMPLOYERS 
 If viewed as an employer-provided benefits case, the issue in 
Hobby Lobby becomes a classic agency problem.  When administering 
                                                                                                                                      
154 Id. at 251-52 (asserting that “being severely underinsured is the same as 
being uninsured, as the empirical evidence about the consumption behavior of 
these two groups demonstrates”). 
155 Pendo, supra note 145, at 457-58. 
156 Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1963, 1972 (2013). 
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health plans, employers act as their employees’ agents.  But employer and 
employee interests may not align, either economically or ideologically.  As 
predominantly private entities, employers tend to be more interested in 
their business operations than the promotion of public health.157  Because it 
is frequently in employers’ best interests to keep costs low,158 employers 
have strong financial incentives to construct their benefits to avoid legal 
penalties, such as those in the ACA’s pay-or-play provisions, while reaping 
potential benefits, tax or otherwise, whenever possible.   Moreover, 
employers may have certain ideologies.  While this claim is most clear in 
the case of sole proprietorships—where the person and the business are one 
in the same—Hobby Lobby illustrated that corporate persons are made up 
of actual persons, whose beliefs may also affect how they want to run their 
business.  These efficiency- and ideology-driven interests can impact the 
kinds of health-insurance benefits that employers offer their workers. 
                                                                                                                                      
157 Long before the ACA, Dayna Matthew explained: “[L]egislators, and to a 
lesser degree the courts interpreting these statutes, have essentially appointed 
employers their agents to serve a broad social ideal: to provide health insurance 
coverage and, therefore, health care access to all working Americans, on a non-
discriminatory, virtually non-contributory basis.” Matthew, supra note 99, at 1066.  
However, employers often act with self-interest.  See Brendan S. Maher & Radha 
A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can Regulate Health 
Insurance under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275, 283 (2013) (explaining 
that “the employer-sponsored insurance regime involves voluntary promises 
undertaken by actors motivated by self interest”).  While Matthew published her 
Essay in 1996, almost twenty years later her observations still ring true: 
 
Current regulatory controls miss the mark by not reckoning with 
the fact that employers are increasingly unable to satisfy both the 
weighty social goal that has been imposed upon them—ensuring 
that all working Americans are guaranteed minimal access to 
health care—and their obligation to serve their own business 
interests.  Thus, it is not only employees that incur significant 
agency costs under the employment-based health insurance 
system, but to the extent that we collectively depend upon 
employers to serve health policy objectives through this system, 
these costs are borne by the rest of society as well. 
 
Matthew, supra note 99, at 1040-41. 
158 Matthew, supra note 99, at 1038 (“Assuming employers are . . .rational 
utility maximizers, their objective is to minimize the cost of obtaining the level and 
quality of health insurance that the labor market, relevant to the employer’s 
enterprise, demands.”). 
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 Employers are not villains here: An employer’s primary function is 
not providing health insurance.  Their cost-reducing strategies may be 
economically rational and their ideological beliefs may be sincerely held.  
Thus, employers find themselves in a sticky situation.  On one hand, the 
health plans they provide are a key instrument of health-care reform’s 
effort to expand access.  Yet on the other, they have businesses to run and 
are composed of people with personal lives and beliefs.  These competing 
loyalties have not gone unnoticed.  Early in the history of employer-
provided benefits, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, when 
administering an insurance plan, employers rightly serve the interests of 
both themselves and their employees.159  The question then becomes how 
to properly balance these competing concerns. 
One way to think of this possible conflict of interest is in agency 
terms.160  To invoke the agency model, one party must be entrusted with 
serving the interests of another.  Commentators have traced an employer’s 
duty to act on behalf of its employees when administering health insurance 
to its obligations under ERISA161 and the ACA162 and to the common 
                                                                                                                                      
159 See Boseman v. Conn. Gen. Life. Ins., 301 U.S. 196, 204 (1937) (“When 
procuring the policy, obtaining applications of employees, taking payroll deduction 
orders, reporting changes in the insured group, paying premiums and generally in 
doing whatever may serve to obtain and keep the insurance in force, employers act 
not as agents of the insurer but for their employees and for themselves.”). 
160 See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 49; Hall, supra note 99; Matthew, 
supra note 98, at 1038 (asserting that “the agency model best explains the nature 
of, and problems presented by, the employment-based health insurance system”).  
However, the agency model is not the only way to understand the relationship 
between employers and employees with respect to health insurance.  See Matthew, 
supra note 98, at 1039 (“One might conclude the employment-based insurance 
system is not an agency problem at all, but rather a contract relationship in which 
one party undertakes to resolve a classic collective action problem incident to the 
terms of the contract.”). 
161 Bronsteen et al. explain that an ERISA plan is effectively a quasi-trust, 
thereby giving rise to all of the associated obligations.  Bronsteen et al., supra note 
49, at 2304 (“Indeed, an ERISA benefit plan is, in design and practice, a form of 
statutory quasi trust administered by the employer (or its designees) as a fiduciary 
for the employee.  Whatever the extent of ERISA’s overlap with trust law, it is 
undeniable that an ERISA benefit plan creates (in economic terms) an agency 
relationship: the principal (i.e., the plan participant) relies on the agent (i.e., the 
plan fiduciary) to protect and advance the principal’s interest.”). 
162 Hall identifies both pre- and post-ACA health entitlements.  Hall, supra 
note 100, at 1745-54. 
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law.163  If employers act as fiduciaries, they would then owe their 
employees the duties of loyalty and care.164  Yet, with any agency 
relationship comes the potential for agency problems: Will the agent truly 
prioritize the interests of the principal?165  Given the importance of health 
insurance in ensuring health-care access166 and the fact that employer-
provided benefits are often determined pre-employment, effectively 
making them contracts of adhesion,167 employees are particularly 
vulnerable principals.  Employees must rely on their employers to select 
the very benefits that will determine whether and how they obtain health 
care.  Specifically, the relationship generates agency costs because at times 
the interests of employer-agent and the employee-principal will diverge.168 
It is worth pausing to note that agency costs are not inevitable.  
They only occur when the agent’s and the principal’s priorities do not 
align.  Sometimes, however, employer and employee health-insurance 
interests converge.  For example, a large employer acting on behalf of its 
employees has more bargaining clout and can therefore negotiate better 
rates and terms—as well as advocate more zealously in the event of a 
                                                                                                                                      
163 Matthew, however, asserts that the agency relationship “arises between 
employer and employee when, upon accepting a job in which health insurance 
benefits represent a portion of the compensation package, an employee engages his 
employer to perform the service of purchasing and administering a health 
insurance plan on his behalf.”  Matthew, supra note 99, at 1038.  As a result, 
according to Matthew, “courts impose a general responsibility, akin to a fiduciary 
duty, upon employers administering health insurance plans for their employees.”  
Id. at 1054; see also Dawes Mining Co. v. Callahan, 272 S.E.2d 267, 269 ( Ga. 
1980) (holding that “in procuring the group policy and obtaining employee 
applications, the employer acts as an agent of the employees where the employees 
will be contributing toward payment of the premium”). 
164 Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2304; Hall, supra note 99, at 1763-65 
(discussing the duties of loyalty and care).  However, it is worth noting that while 
scholars and courts may view employers as fiduciaries with respect to their health-
insurance plans, the employers themselves may not share that perspective.  See 
Matthew, supra note 98, at 1041 (“Employers do not perceive themselves or 
behave as their employees’ agents in the insurance market.”). 
165 Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2304. 
166 See Part I.B., supra. 
167 Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2320. 
168 See id. at 2299 (defining “agency cost” as “the cost arising from a system 
that gives an agent the incentive to act contrary to the interests of its principal”).  
Likewise Matthew explains, “Costs are generated by this agency relationship, like 
all others, because employers’ objectives will diverge from the objectives of their 
employee-principals.”  Matthew, supra note 99, at 1038. 
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dispute—than most employees acting on their own.169  Also the employer-
provided benefits system saves individuals a fair amount of time and 
hassle.  Employees do not have to seek out health insurance or pay brokers; 
instead, upon employment, they receive a plan—or choice of plan from a 
heavily restricted menu of options—that has already been negotiated, 
purchased, and administered on their behalf.170  Allowing an employer to 
act as an employee’s health-insurance agent thereby delivers some measure 
of administrative ease and convenience.  From this perspective, a limited 
number of plans could actually be a benefit of the employer-provided 
health-insurance system because it simplifies the decision-making 
process.171  Admittedly, many of the historically cited benefits of the 
employer-provided system, such as collective negotiation and a limited 
number of possible choices for insureds, are likewise present when 
purchasing policies on the exchanges.  Regardless, even when serving their 
own interests, under some circumstances, employers may act as excellent 
agents for their employees.172 
Despite the lower cost and administrative advantages of employer-
provided health insurance, evidence indicates that employers do not select 
the insurance that employees would choose for themselves.173  Put 
differently, employers and employees have different views regarding what 
health insurance is “optimal.”174  Further complicating matters is that the 
employer acts as the agent of multiple principals, each who may have 
                                                                                                                                      
169 Matthew, supra note 99, at 1043; Moore, Employment-Based, supra note 
50, at 897. 
170 Matthew, supra note 99, at 1043; see also Moore, Employment-Based, 
supra note 50, at 896-97 (explaining how the employer-provided benefits system 
saves employees transaction costs). 
171 See Moore, Employment-Based, supra note 50, at 897 (asserting that 
“[e]mployers assist employees by offering employees a limited choice among 
plans”). 
172 See Matthew, supra note 99, at 1040 (“Employers act in their 
entrepreneurial self-interest, purchasing health insurance under terms which may 
also benefit and serve the employees’ needs and interests as well.”).  Research 
confirms this outcome.  See Moore, Employment-Based, supra note 50, at 897 
(citing Pamela B. Peele et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance: Are 
Employers Good Agents for Their Employees?, 78 MILBANK Q. 5 (2000). 
173 Matthew, supra note 99, at 1056 (stating that “employers’ and employees’ 
demand curves for health insurance are distinctive”); id. at 1061 (asserting that 
“employers, acting as agents for their employees, will make different health 
insurance choices than employee representatives will make for themselves”). 
174 Id. at 1057. 
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different needs.  For instance, it may be in the best interests of one set of 
employees to have comprehensive coverage with large networks that lack 
financial incentives to lower spending but another set of employees might 
prefer lower health-care costs so that they take home more in wages every 
month.  Exacerbating this issue is the zero-sum nature of providing 
benefits—employers and insurers either grant benefits and pay or deny 
benefits and save—and the level of discretion left to providers in making 
those choices.175 
Of course, the agent-principal paradigm reduces the very complex 
interests at stake in the employer-provided benefits systems to a single 
vector: employee and employers.  Several other parties could have a dog in 
this fight.  Employers’ desire to maximize profits could flow from a 
competing fiduciary relationship, company to shareholders.  And the 
United States government itself has an interest in employer-provided health 
insurance, as it is a key part of the ACA’s move toward universal coverage.  
Unfortunately, Congress’s decision to vest private employers with the 
responsibility of insuring a significant portion of Americans perpetuates the 
intractable tension between the employers’ interests, whether in efficiency 
and cost minimization or in practicing religion, and the government’s 
desire to improve health-care access by expanding health-insurance 
coverage. 
There is no need to tether health insurance to employment.  Yet, 
none of the commentators in Hobby Lobby—or even the Supreme Court 
Justices themselves—questioned the link between work and health 
insurance.  This silence reveals the tacit assumption that Americans are 
entitled to health insurance through their employers.  However, this 
entitlement does not stem from a necessary relationship between health 
insurance and employment (if anything the agency issues described above 
undermine the wisdom of such a system) but rather the historical tendency 
of employers to offer health insurance in the first place.  Maher explains 
that if a substantial number of people receive a particular good in 
conjunction with employment, they will conflate the practical connection 
between work and the good with a logical connection between work and 
the good.176  In other words, the reality that so many employers provide 
health insurance translates to the belief that employer-provided health 
insurance is sensible.  However, as this Essay has attempted to 
demonstrate, employers are not necessarily logical health-insurance 
                                                                                                                                      
175 Bronsteen at al., supra note 49, at 2311 (explaining that in the zero-sum 
game of benefits distribution “fiduciaries lose by granting benefits”). 
176 Maher, supra note 38. 
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providers.  To that end, Maher poses the important question: “Why did the 
ACA promote, to some degree, the continued existence of [employer-
provided] health insurance?”177  While he notes some possible political and 
tax-based reasons, he concludes that “the legislation’s pro-[employer-
provided benefits] bias was a questionable (although not indefensible) 
policy choice.”178  To be sure, Congress could have avoided the kinds of 
agency problems described above if it had done away with the employer-
provided benefits system.179 
B. UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED BENEFITS 
 At least one way to avoid future Hobby Lobbys would be to stop 
the American reliance on the employer-provided benefits.  While such a 
drastic change will not likely come from Congress anytime soon, there is 
some reason to believe the employer-provided benefits system—at least as 
conceived by the ACA—is relatively uncertain, including the controversies 
surrounding the employer mandate and the potential effect other parts of 
the legislation might have on employers. 
 Through the employer mandate, as described in Part I, the ACA not 
only kept the employer-provided benefits system intact, it actually codified 
the American reliance on employers to provide health insurance.  However, 
the mandate has not gone unchallenged.  Originally, the employer mandate 
was set to take effect in 2014.  Consequently, President Obama made 
headlines when he delayed its implementation until 2015 to allow 
employers more time to comply with the new law.180  In a similar move, in 
February 2014, the White House announced that the employers on the 
                                                                                                                                      
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 For additional arguments in favor of decoupling health insurance and 
employment, see Hadley Heath, Disconnect Insurance from Employment, REAL 
CLEAR POLICY BLOG, Feb. 7, 2014, http://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2014/ 
02/07/disconnect_insurance_from_employment_828.html and Seth J. Chandler, 
The Cons of the ACA, ACA DEATH SPIRAL BLOG, May 29, 2015 (discussing the 
employer mandate), available at http://acadeathspiral.org/2015/05/29/the-cons-of-
the-aca/. 
180 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin & Amy Goldstein, White House Delays Health 
Insurance Mandate for Medium-Sized Employers Until 2016, WASH. POST, Feb. 
10, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 3711223; Robert Pear, Further Delays for 
Employers in Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/us/politics/health-insurance-enforcement-
delayed-again-for-some-employers.html?r=0. 
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lower end of the spectrum—employers with fifty to ninety-nine 
employees—would have until 2016 to institute the required changes.181  
Similarly, employers of one hundred or more employees can escape the 
statutory penalties in 2015 by offering affordable policies to seventy—not 
ninety-five—percent of their full-time workers.182 
 Opponents of the ACA have launched several strategies to attempt 
to undermine the employer mandate.  In November 2014, House Speaker 
John Boehner, on behalf of the Republican members of the House, sued the 
secretaries of the Treasury and HHS and their respective departments, 
alleging that the Obama administration abused its executive power by twice 
delaying the implementation of the employer mandate.183  Most recently, 
Burwell filed a motion to dismiss, the House responded, and she replied.  
The litigation is ongoing.  Additionally, in early 2015, the House passed a 
bill that would redefine the full-time workweek from thirty to forty 
hours.184  While champions of the legislation assert it is designed to protect 
workers from potential gaming by employers to avoid the mandate (as 
described in Part II), opponents view it as a way to undermine the employer 
mandate’s application to some of the nation’s more vulnerable workers, 
people who work under forty hours per week.185  Economists estimate that 
if such a bill were to pass, one million Americans would lose their health-
insurance coverage.186  Those individuals would either end up with 
government-provided benefits or with no health insurance at all.187  Such a 
development could balloon federal spending by over fifty billion dollars in 
the next ten years.188  However, the bill’s success seems highly unlikely.  It 
                                                                                                                                      
181 See 79 Fed. Reg. 8544 (Feb. 12, 2014)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, 54, 
301) (explaining the changes to the ACA’s employer mandate provisions); see also 
Eilperin & Goldstein, supra note 180; Pear, supra note 180. 
182 Id. 
183 The lawsuit also asserted that funds tied to the ACA’s cost-sharing program 
were not authorized by Congress.  Complaint, U.S. House of Rep. v. Burwell, No. 
14-cv-01967 (79 F.Supp. 3d 1 (D.C. 2015)), 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/boehner_burwell_20141121.pdf. 
184 Jonathon Weisman, House Fires Shot at Health Care Law, Seeking to Alter 
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has not garnered sufficient support in the Senate and President Obama has 
indicated he would veto it if the legislation made it to his desk.189 
 Although ACA adversaries have taken direct shots at the law’s 
reliance on employers to provide health insurance, certain provisions of the 
statute could also—perhaps inadvertently—move us away from the 
employer-provided system.  Particularly the Cadillac tax, a forty percent 
excise tax on benefits over a particular threshold, could encourage 
employers to opt in favor of the no-offer penalty if the cost of providing 
benefits continues to rise.190 
 
* * * 
 
 When situated in the greater context of employer-provided 
benefits, instead of being the clash between reproductive freedom and 
religious rights, the central conflict of Hobby Lobby becomes employer 
interests versus employee interests.  Whether ideological or economic, the 
employers who offer health insurance have different priorities than the 
employees who use those benefits.  But that is not to say employers should 
be more selfless.  After all, the primary function of an employer is not to 
provide health insurance.  Thus, viewed from this perspective, Hobby 
Lobby looks more like a failure of the employer-provided benefits system 
than a victory for the religious right.  Perhaps then the most sensible way to 
avoid future conflicts of this kind would be to eliminate our reliance on 
employers to provide health insurance.  Yet given all of the difficulties 
surrounding the ACA, Congress is not likely to revisit this issue for quite a 
while.  But in the meantime, we could see the prevalence of employer-
provided benefits winding down, in part because of steadfast Republican 




This Essay’s central assertion is that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby is 
best understood as an employer-provided benefits case.  The vast majority 
of Americans depend on health insurance to access health care.  Employers 
are the primary providers of health insurance for the non-elderly.  Tying 
health insurance to employment renders employers de facto health-care 
policy makers who unwittingly serve both gatekeeping and regulating 
functions. 
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190 Roberts, supra note 4. 
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While the ACA could have untethered health insurance from 
employment, instead it entrenched their relationship.  Now certain 
employers must provide their workers with comprehensive, affordable 
health insurance or face a tax penalty.  Yet while employers may offer 
health insurance to their employees, they are still private entities with 
interests—both financial and ideological—beyond providing 
comprehensive, cost-effective coverage.  As long as we depend on 
employers to provide health insurance for millions of Americans, we will 
continue to see conflicts regarding the kinds of policies employees need 
and the kinds of policies employers are willing to provide.w 
